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Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is widely seen as generating technology spillovers to indigenous
firms in a transition economy. Prior research has measured only the net effect of spillovers from
FDI on the productivity of domestic firms. This paper disentangles the positive effect of
technology transfer from that of competition. We use a production function framework to
estimate the impact of technology transfer from FDI on the output growth of domestic firms in
Estonia for the period 1995-1999. Employing panel data techniques we control for industry and
firm specific effects, and a Heckman two-stage procedure is performed to control for sample self-
selection bias.
The size of the spillovers varies with the characteristics of both the incoming FDI and the
recipient local firm. The magnitude of the spillover depends on the measure of foreign presence
employed as proxy, and it is moderated by the recipient firm’s size, ownership structure and trade
orientation. Spillovers of technology transfer benefit from competition of foreign firms as the
competitive pressure induces domestic firms to use more efficiently their existing technologies, or
search for new ones so that they are able to maintain their market shares. However, negative side-
effects of FDI arise with their headhunting of qualified employees. Thus we find that local firms
with high skilled labour experience higher growth, but this growth is negatively affected by FDI
in the industry.
Our results, moreover, contribute to the enterprise transformation literature by showing
interesting different impact on firms with different ownership structure. We find that state owned
and outsider owned firms benefit from spillovers of technology transfer, whereas insider owned
firms experience strong negative spillovers.
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1INTRODUCTION
The expected spillovers of inward foreign direct investment (FDI) have motivated
governments in many transition economies to adopt policies aimed at attracting investors.
These countries have to modernize their industrial structure, upgrade their infrastructure
and acquire new capabilities to flourish the capitalist market economy. The restructuring
of enterprises is thus a core element of economic transition, and a central issue in
economic research on transition economies (Jones et al. 1998, Estrin and Rosevear 1998,
Buck et al. 1998). It is widely recognized that FDI plays an important role in this process
of restructuring the formerly centrally planned economies by providing a vital source of
investment for overcoming the situation of a collapsing state sector and a slowly growing
private sector, and by contributing managerial skills, new technology, capital and
competition (IMF et al. 1991, EBRD 1994, Meyer 2001). These contributions are
expected to benefit not only the foreign-owned business, but also domestic firms that
come in contact with the foreign-owned entity.
Domestic firms are expected to benefit by backward or forward linkages and
demonstration effects and by acquiring modern technology from multinational
corporations (MNCs), as foreign investment is associated with advanced technology.
However, there may also be negative externalities for domestic firms, such as by loosing
skilled employees to MNCs affiliate or increased competition in the host country. A
common belief is that the positive effects in most cases outweigh the negative ones (UN
2001).
Scholars have attempted to show the positive or negative effects of FDI on the
local industry to provide a basis to assess policy measures. So far, results have been
mixed for both developing (e.g. Haddad and Harrison 1993, Aitken and Harrison 1999)
and transition economies (e.g. Djankov and Hoeckman 1998, Konings 2001). Yet few
studies have explored under which conditions such externalities occur. In this study, we
provide new evidence on the size of technology spillovers on productivity of local firms,
and on the industry conditions that favor such spillovers.
We focus on spillovers of technology transfer affecting output growth of local
firms in the same industry. Our prime research questions are: Are these spillovers
positive, and of what magnitude? How do they vary with domestic firm characteristics,
2such as firms’ absorptive capacity, trade orientation, firm size, and ownership structure?
In this study we investigate the role of competition at the industry level by including in
the analysis a competition control variable and the role of domestic firms’ ability to
benefit from spillovers of technology transfer. In addition, we use a unique dataset for
Estonian manufacturing sector that provides us with very rich firm and industry level
panel data (Jones and Mygind 1999).
We employ three alternative proxies for spillovers, and find that their magnitude
varies with the proxy used, underlining that different types of inward FDI generate
different spillovers. In addition, spillovers depend on the recipient firm’s size, its
ownership structure, domestic firm trade orientation and proximity to foreign firms.
Moreover, domestic firms benefit from competition of both foreign and other domestic
firms as it induces them to use more efficiently their existing technologies, or search for
new technology so that they maintain their market shares. In turn, this increases their
ability to reap up the benefits of spillovers. Furthermore, although skilled labor increases
firm’s output growth, its movement toward foreign firms significantly reduces this effect.
Our results, moreover, contribute to the enterprise transformation literature (Estrin and
Wright 1999) by showing interesting different impact on firms with different ownership
structure. We find that state owned and outsider owned firms benefit from spillovers of
technology transfer, whereas insider owned firms experience strong negative spillovers.
However, only outsider owned firms have the resources and the ability to catch up with
foreign competitors. Positive spillovers of both state and outsider owned firms are also
supported by competition.
2. Spillovers from Foreign Direct Investment
2.1. International Transfer of Technology, and its Spillovers
MNCs produce, control and own most of the world’s technology. Almost 80
percent of all private R&D expenditures worldwide are accounted by MNCs (Dunning
1993, 290). By encouraging MNCs to invest, developing countries hope to generate
technology transfer to local firms since foreign direct investment is associated with the
existence of intangible assets owned by the parent firm (Kokko 1992, Blomstrom and
Kokko 1996).
3Technology can be transferred across countries through different channels
including international trade, foreign investment, and contractual transfers. International
trade transfers new technologies embodied in goods, for example new varieties of
differentiated products, or capital goods and equipment. FDI transfers knowledge within
the boundaries of one MNC or between a foreign firm and a local joint-venture partner.
Contractual agreements may transfer technology as arm-length trade in intellectual
property, for instance in form of licensing contracts. The type and extent of technology
transfer vary with characteristics of the technology itself (e.g., age and complexity) and
of the host country (e.g., level of education, labor skills, technology transfer requirements
and competition). For instance, Mansfield and Romero (1980) found that technologies
transferred to affiliates in developed countries were younger than those transferred to
affiliates in developing countries, while the technology given for licensing and to joint
ventures was older than the technology transferred to affiliates. Hence, the more modern
and complex the technology, the less willing the MNC is to transfer it to a third party but
rather to the affiliate. Moreover, Kogut and Zander (1993) show that attributes of
technology such as tacitness, codifiability and teachabiliy determine the likelihood of
licensing. Their results suggest that the more tacit the technology is, the more likely is
that technology is transferred by wholly owned subsidiary. While codifiability and
teachability improve the feasibility of licensing, complexity of technology is a deterrent
for licensing. Nevertheless, if a firm would like to extract all of the rents from its new and
complex technologies they are likely to favor FDI (Caves 1996, World Bank 2000).
A technology that is employed only in a foreign-owned affiliate has limited
impact on the host economy. Yet, through various forms of spillovers, or externalities, it
can be disseminated throughout the host country. Technology spillovers occur when the
activities of one firm lead to improvements in technology and, hence, in productivity of
another firm and as such the first firm cannot capture all benefits created by its
technology. Accordingly, spillovers of technology transfer may materialize through four
main channels: demonstration-imitation, training of domestic employees, competition and
backward-forward linkages. Positive spillovers of technology transfer occur when the
foreign firms after entering the market demonstrate their advanced technologies to
domestic firms, which may afterwards adapt and imitate them (Kokko 1992), when they
4train domestic employees who may leave for the domestic firms2 or through backward-
forward linkages.3 Negative effects may arise from competition when foreign firms with
advanced technologies produce at lower marginal cost and therefore gain market shares
from domestic firms, which results in a reduced domestic productivity. Especially in the
short run, competition can have a negative impact on indigenous firms’ productivity
(Aitken and Harrison 1999). However, it may also be the case that domestic firms react to
foreign competition by using the existing technology more efficiently or by investing in
new technology in order to maintain their market shares (Blomstrom and Kokko 1998)4.
2.2. Empirical Evidence
The empirical literature on FDI spillovers via technology transfer to domestic
firms includes studies on both transition, developing and developed economies. Yet this
literature provides rather mixed results as some studies find that foreign presence has a
positive impact on the productivity of domestic firms, while others find no evidence or a
negative effect.
Scholars have used two approaches to estimate spillover effects of FDI, using
industry level data or firm level data. Studies of the first type generally find positive
spillovers to domestic firms. For instance, Caves (1974) who examines Australian
manufacturing, Globerman (1979) in a study of Canadian manufacturing, and Blomstrom
and Persson (1983) who study Mexican manufacturing in 1970, present evidence on the
positive effect of foreign presence on the labor productivity of local firms. All these
studies confirm on the basis of aggregate data that spillovers are significant across
industries. However, Kokko (1994) argues that spillovers might not occur in all kinds of
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 Empirical evidence on spillovers from labor mobility is far from conclusive. However, given that MNCs pay higher
wages to prevent spillovers from labor mobility, one would expect to see low labor mobility especially in developing
countries where MNCs have substantial advantages over domestic firms compared to MNCs in developed countries.
For instance, Gershenberg (1987) finds only 16% of labor movement from MNCs to Kenyan firms. While Aitken,
Harrison and Lipsey (1995) in a study for Venezuela, Mexico and U.S. show that higher level of FDI is associated with
higher wages in all three countries. However, in the two developing countries they find no evidence of domestic firms
paying higher wages. Recent theoretical papers by Glass and Saggi (2000) and Fosuri, Motta and Ronde (2001) on
spillovers from labor mobility seem to confirm previous arguments.
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 Because of high transportation costs and/or local content requirements foreign firms are forced to purchase
intermediate goods from domestic suppliers and as identified by Lall (1978) improve the productivity of indigenous
firms by providing technical assistance and training of employees to increase the quality of suppliers products’, by
assisting them in purchasing of raw materials so that they maintain high quality intermediate goods and by causing
pressure on suppliers to meet reliability and speed of delivery.
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 Negative welfare effects can also occur under certain conditions of export taxes and/or import subsidies that occurred
in some transition economies (Devereux and Roberts 1997).
5industries, especially if foreign firms operate in “enclaves”, i.e. in isolation from
domestic firms. Using a cross section of Mexican manufacturing industry, he finds no
spillovers in industries with high foreign market share and large productivity gaps. On the
other hand, industries without such characteristics show a positive correlation between
foreign presence and local productivity.
Studies of the second type employing firm level data provide no or negative
evidence of spillovers to domestic firms. For instance, Haddad and Harrison (1993)
examine the effect of foreign presence on the relative productivity of local firms (i.e.,
comparing the firm level productivity with that of the best practice firm in the industry).
Using data for Morocco they find no evidence of spillovers. However, competition seems
to push local firms toward the best practice frontier in industries with low level of
technology. Hence, spillovers do not always take place in all industrial sectors. Aitken
and Harrison (1999) find negative spillovers, which they refer as “market stealing effect”,
i.e., foreign investment reduces domestic plant productivity in the short run by forcing
domestic firms to cut production. In addition, they also test for the possibility that
spillovers are “local”. However, they find almost no evidence to support this claim.
Kokko, Tasini and Zejan (1996) use firm level data for Uruguayan manufacturing
sector in examining how the productivity of individual plants (rather than industry
averages) is affected by foreign presence. Dividing the sample in two sub-samples by size
of the technology gaps, they find that spillovers are significant only in industries with a
small technology gap. If the gap is small, foreign technology appears to be more useful
for local firms as they posses the skills needed to apply or learn the foreign technology.
In contrast, Sjoholm (1999) finds evidence of spillovers to domestic firms only in a sub-
sample with a large technology gap. Moreover, he finds that a large degree of
competition increases spillovers.
Studies on transition economies have emerged only in recent years. Djankov and
Hoeckman (1998), Yudaeva, et al (2000), Kinoshita (2000) and Konings (2001)
investigate spillovers of technology transfer in transition economies on the basis of firm
level data, whereas Zhang (2001) uses data from Chinese regions. The conclusions of
most of these studies are in line with previous results of no or negative spillovers to
domestic firms in developing economies. For instance, Yudaeva et al. (2000) find no
6evidence on local spillovers, however, in contrast to Aitken and Harrison (1999) they find
strong positive spillovers for medium size firms which dominate over the negative
spillovers of small firms. In contrast to Yudaeva et al. (2000), the results of Konings
(2001) are in line with Aitken and Harrison (1999). He finds negative spillovers to
domestic firms in Bulgaria and Romania, which suggests that the negative effect of
competition dominates the positive effect of technology transfer. In contrast, he finds no
evidence of spillovers for domestic firms in Poland. Djankov and Hoeckman (1998)
using firm level data for Czech Republic for the period 1992-1996 find that firm
characteristics such as firm size, labor productivity and profitability seem to attract FDI.
Accounting for them and using the whole sample of foreign and domestic firms, the
authors find a positive, albeit insignificant, impact of FDI on TFP growth. While focusing
only on domestic firms they find negative and significant spillovers. Accordingly, the
authors conclude that other channels of technology transfer such as trade channels
(measured by import penetration) positively affect the performance of Czech firms.
Differently from all these studies, Zhang (2001) investigates the impact of FDI on
China’s economic growth and finds that FDI contributes to economic growth through
positive spillovers of technology transfer and facilitated transition. Furthermore, these
spillovers are larger in the costal than the inland regions.
The different inferences in the literature on the existence of positive spillovers
from FDI are mainly the result of using aggregate versus firm level data. In the studies
employing cross sectional data of industries rather than firms, the coefficient on the
foreign share has been interpreted as the measure of spillovers. Yet, aggregate data at the
sector level have been unable to control for differences of productivity across sectors,
which may be correlated with the foreign presence. In other words, the observed
correlation between the foreign presence and the productivity of domestic firms might be
partially due to the fact that foreign firms invest in more productive industries. This issue
is known as the endogeneity problem, which if not controlled for leads to an upward bias
of the spillover coefficient. In the present research we employ a panel of firm-level data,
which allows us to control for endogeneity, as well as selection biases.
72.3. The approach in this study
The prior theoretical and empirical literature suggests that technology spillovers
from FDI may increase or decrease the productivity of domestic firms in the same
industry. Our first proposition thus is that there is a spillover effect, and we aim at
establishing its direction and magnitude. Prior studies have measured only the net effect
between the positive impact of technology transfer and negative impact of competition,
both stemming from the entrance of the foreign presence in the market. In this paper we
disentangle the effect of technology transfer from that of competition by employing
technology and competition control variables.
Secondly, the literature suggests that spillovers vary with characteristics of the
local firms. To explain the causes of spillovers, we aim to identify characteristics that
explain the reaction of domestic firms to entry of foreign firms, and consequent changes
in competition, and higher technology level employed in foreign investment firms.
Accordingly, we include investment in intangible assets, investment in new machinery
and equipment and labor quality as measures of innovation at firm level, investment in
new technology to replace the outdated capital and labor force ability to operate the new
technology. Intangible assets in their definition include technological know-how, brand
names, patents, managerial skills, marketing and export networks and reputation, which
are important elements of research and development5. In addition, as stressed by Teece
(1977), intangible assets are more likely to be transferred at a reasonable cost to
subsidiaries rather than by licensing to an independent firm.
We moreover analyze interaction effects of these firm specific variables with
technology spillovers of FDI. Cohen and Levinthal (1989) have argued, there are two
‘faces’ of R&D: it not only simulates innovation but also increases firm’s absorptive
capacity, i.e. its ability to identify, assimilate and exploit outside knowledge6. This
absorptive capacity is accounted for with the interaction effect between intangible assets
and investment in new machinery and equipment with the spillover variable.
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 Wang and Blomstrom (1992) also highlight the importance of learning efforts (absorptive capacity) of a
local firm in increasing the rate of technology transfer. Furthermore, Kamien and Zang (2000) show
through a game theoretical framework that a firm should “buy a ticket to meet the foreign firm halfway”
i.e., it should invest in R&D so that it is able to absorb the advanced technology of foreign firms.
8The impact of the movement of skilled labor movement to and from domestic
firms is captured by the interaction of labor quality with foreign presence at the industry
level. By moving to domestic firms, skilled workers bring with them the knowledge of
the advanced technologies of foreign firms, which may lead to improvements in
technology and hence in productivity of domestic firms. Borensztein et. al. (1998)
include an interaction term of human capital with the FDI flow to account for the fact that
a country needs human capital to benefit from FDI. They find that FDI contributes to
higher productivity growth only if the country has a minimum threshold of human
capital. Hence, if there is skilled labor movement from foreign to domestic firms we
expect the coefficient of interaction term of labor quality with foreign presence to be
positive. On the other hand, skilled labor movement in the opposite direction will result
in a negative coefficient of the interaction term. Likewise, the existence of the absorptive
capacity would be identified by a positive coefficient of both interaction terms of
intangible assets and investment in new machinery and equipment with foreign presence.
3. Empirical Analysis
If technology embodied in foreign-owned firms is transmitted to local firms this
should result in higher productivity levels and growth rates of local firms. As productivity
(levels and growth rates) is usually analyzed with production functions, we start our
analysis with a general form of the production function. To produce the output Yit the
firm needs capital Kit, labor Lit and materials Mit. Therefore the production function of
each firm (i) is:
Yijt = Aijt F(Kijt, Lijt, Mijt) (1)
where i denotes the firm, j the industry and t the year. We assume that the production
function is homogenous of degree g in inputs, and it is also increasing and concave in all
its arguments.
Aijt is the total factor productivity (TFP) or Solow residual, which is assumed to
vary across firms, sectors and over time. Felipe (1999) in a survey of the literature on
total factor productivity describes Aijt as “a measure of elements such as managerial
9capabilities and organizational competence, R&D, inter-sector transfer of resources,
increasing returns to scale, embodied technical progress, and diffusion of technology.”
Hence, one can express Aijt as function of such variables depending on the focus of the
study. Such an approach has also been adopted by Haddad and Harrison (1993), Sjoholm
(1999), Zukowska-Gagelman (2000) and Kinoshita (2000).
Taking log of (1) and time derivative and expressing the growth of variables in
discrete time (1) will be transformed as follows:
dYijt / Yijt = dAijt / Aijt + [d (log Yijt) / d (log Kijt)] dKijt / Kijt + [d (log Yijt) / d (log Lijt)]
dLijt / Lijt + [d (log Yijt) / d (log Mijt)] dMijt / Mijt (2)
where dYijt is the time derivative of log Y, the same holds for dA, dK, dL, dM.
In addition, d (log Yijt) / d (log (z))= byz , where z = Kijt, Lijt, Mijt, is the elasticity of output
with respect to inputs. Hence, we can rewrite (2) as follows:
dYijt / Yijt = dAijt / Aijt + byk dKijt / Kijt + byl dLijt / Lijt + bym dMijt / Mijt (3)
In discrete time (3) is transformed in:
log(Yi,jt+1 / Yijt) = byk log(Ki,j,t+1 / Kijt) + byl  log(Li,j,,t+1 / Lijt) + bym log(Mi,j,t+1 / Mijt) + d Aijt / Aijt
(4)
Based on the discussion above the growth of total factor productivity is assumed to be a
function of the following variables:
dAijt/Aijt  = f (IAssetijt/Yijt, Investmentijt/Yijt, LaborQualityijt, Spilloverjt, Concentrationjt,
Exportijt/Yijt, dj, dt ) (5)
IAssetijt/Yijt the ratio of intangible assets to net sales;
Investmentijt/Yijt the ratio of the expenditure on new machinery and equipment to
net sales, to account for the investment in new technology;
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LaborQualityijt the share of skilled workers in total workforce;
Spilloverjt proxied by three alternative measures: the share of foreign firm’s
employment/ equity/ sales in total industry’s employment/ equity/
sales;
Exportijt/Yijt the ratio of export revenues to net sales;
Concentrationjt industry concentration is proxied by Herfindahl index7 (A high
value of this indicates a high degree of industry concentration, thus
less competition);
dj, dt industry and time dummies included to capture industry specific
effects such as general demand conditions in a given industry.
Time dummies are included to capture economy wide shocks in
productivity.
*** Table 1 approximately here ***
We expect coefficients for inputs to be positive and significant, whereas the
coefficient for the spillovers variable may be positive or negative. A positive coefficient
points to positive spillovers of technology transfer while a negative coefficient would
indicate that foreign firms might operate in clusters that impede spillovers or that
domestic firms are not able to benefit from foreign presence in the market. The
coefficients of investment in intangible assets, in new machinery and equipment, the
share of skilled workers, and exports are expected to have a positive and significant effect
on the growth of output. Finally, the coefficient for industry concentration (Herfindahl
index) may be positive or negative as competition can make domestic firms use more
efficiently the existing technology or search for new technology in order to maintain their
market shares. However, competition may be detrimental for domestic firms, if fewer
economies of scale are realized, or firms retain excess capacity as foreign firms enter the
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 Herfindahl is calculated at a 2-digit industry level. Although it would have been better to use a much more
disaggregated Herfindahl, we could not do this because at a more disaggregated level the number of firms
drops substantially. In addition, official statistics do not provide information on industrial concentration
ratios.
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domestic market with advanced technology and produce at a lower marginal cost and
take away market shares away from domestic firms.
4. The Data
The data used in this analysis contains yearly information on Estonian firms for
the period 1995-1999. This data has been obtained from the Estonian Statistical Agency
(ESA) and, in broad terms, consists of ownership, financial and wage information. The
ownership information is provided by a special ownership survey run by ESA sent to
non-fully state owned firms, i.e. firms that have been fully or partially privatized. This
information is then augmented with that of the fully state owned firms known as such in a
given year. Financial and wage data comes from firm’s financial statements (balance
sheet and income statement). The data set used in the estimation consists of 1836
observations of which 430 firms in 1995, 412 in 1996, 380 in 1997, 320 in 1998 and 294
firms in 1999. Table 2 presents means and standard deviations of principal variables used
in the analysis. This data set is quite representative as it covers 50% of manufacturing
employment of year 95, the starting year of our analysis. The different number of firms in
every year is caused by exit of firms over time. This lack of observations for some firms
over the whole time period gives rise to sample selection problem, which will be treated
in detail in the next section.
A common problem with data over time is that for a given year data is expressed
in current prices. This makes it important to avoid biases that might arise due to inflation.
With 1995 as the base year, all variables are deflated to 1995 prices using the appropriate
PPI deflators. There are four ownership groups calculated from the data: insider owned,
foreign owned, state owned, and outsider owned firms. Foreign firms are considered
those with at least 10% of their nominal capital owned by foreigners while the rest of the
three groups is classified as domestic firms8. We do not distinguish between joint
ventures and FDI because the purpose of this study is to assess the impact foreign firms
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15% of equity owned by foreigners, Haddad and Harrison (1993) define as foreign firms those with at least
5% equity owned by foreigners and Djankov and Hoekman (1998) consider a threshold of 20%.
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have on domestic firm performance, through technology transfer. Thirteen industrial
groups are defined according to a 2-digit ISIC classification (see Table 3).
*** Tables 2 & 3 approximately here ***
4.1. Data Description
Variables used in the empirical analysis, and their measurements are reported in
table 1. Regarding the measure of spillover, as seen in this table, we use three different
measures in line with the received empirical literature.
Table 3 in the appendix presents the number of observations by industrial affiliation
for the total sample. Foreign presence, denoted as spillovers in table 1, is highest in the
following industries: leather products, wood and paper products, rubber, plastic and non-
metallic mineral products and electricity, gas and water supply. In most industries,
foreign presence is higher in industry sales and equity than in industry employment.
Column 4 of this table also shows the distribution of mean intangible assets across
industries. We see that while foreign presence varies substantially in magnitude across
industries, intangible assets vary less, but are highest in food products, wood and paper
products, rubber, plastic and non-metallic products and furniture products. Foreign
presence is not associated with large investment in intangible assets, as might be
expected.
Table 4 shows the relative performance of foreign firms, reported as ratio of the
mean of the respective variable for foreign firms to that for domestic firms, for each
industry9. Foreign firms outperform domestic firms by most criteria: in most industries
they have higher capital intensity, higher labor productivity, pay higher wages and export
more than domestic firms. It may be expected that higher productivity and better export
performance may come from firm size effect. However, in most industries foreign firms
tend to be smaller than domestic ones (column 4). Moreover, domestic firms invest more
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means that the domestic firm is performing better for the given variable. Firm size is measured by number
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in intangible assets and new machineries than foreign firms in most industries10(column 3
and 5) This is consistent with the catching up hypothesis, i.e. domestic firms invest
relatively more than foreign firms in order to increase their technological capabilities and
their ability to benefit from foreign firms’ advanced technology.
*** Table 4 approximately here ***
5. Estimation Procedures
We use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Fixed Effects (FE) and Generalized Least
Squares (GLS) methods to estimate equation 4. The specification includes output growth
as the dependant variable and the growth in inputs, the spillover variable, the ratio of
investment in intangible assets to output, the ratio of investment in new machinery and
equipment to output, labor quality, their interaction with the spillover variable,
Herfindahl index as a measure of industry concentration separated into foreign and
domestic concentration, the ratio of export to output as well as industry and time
dummies as independent variables.
The interaction of labor quality with the spillover variable accounts for the
movement of skilled labor from and to domestic firms, whereas the Herfindahl indexes
capture the effect of competition. Therefore what remains to be captured from the
spillover coefficient is the effect of demonstration-imitation and vertical linkages.
We employ different panel data procedures to avert the following estimation
problems that may otherwise generate biased and inefficient estimates: sample self-
selection bias, endogeneity, autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. Sample self-selection
bias steams from the fact that the dependant variable is not observed for all firms over the
whole time period in the data set. This might result from the fact that firms go bankrupt,
merge with other firms or choose not to report. Not correcting for it leads to biased
estimates (Greene 1993). We account for this by running a Heckman two-step procedure
to calculate the probability that the firm is included in the sample based on firm’s profit,
                                                
10
 As in most cases the ratio is less than one, i.e., the mean of investment in intangible assets and in new
machinery is higher for domestic firms.
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labor productivity and industry affiliation. The resulting inverse mills ratio is then
included as right hand side variable.
Endogeneity can arise by two different effects. First, foreign firms may invest in
more productive industries, leading to a reverse causality from the left hand side variable
to the spillover measure. Second, domestic firms’ decision to invest in new machinery
and equipment depends on past and current levels of output and profit, which on their
side are affected by investment rates. To account for both sources of endogeneity, we
employ lagged values as instruments for the respective variables, i.e., investment in new
machinery and equipment and spillovers.
Autocorrelation may be caused by omission of unobserved variables. These
omitted variables, such as better management or organizational structure may give rise to
the correlation between indigenous firm output growth and the spillover variable.
Heteroskedasticity arises from different firm and industry characteristics. Although,
heteroskedasticity is generally corrected by weighting observations with the variable that
is its source (Greene 1993), in this framework we have to account for a general form of
heteroskedasticity. In table 5, we present the results of a first order autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity test exploiting the panel nature of the data. As seen the null hypothesis
of no autocorrelation and no heteroskedasticity is rejected at any significance level. There
are different approaches to correct for them separately11, however, in our analysis we
have to correct for both simultaneously to obtain efficient estimates and robust standard
errors. We do this with a GLS regression that corrects for a general form of
heteroskedasticity and group specific first order autocorrelation structure.
*** Table 5 approximately here ***
The OLS results are adjusted for heteroskedasticity using clusters based on
individual firm groupings over time, where clusters also help in attenuating
autocorrelation. Nevertheless, to exploit the panel nature of the data and to control for
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employing autocorrelated panel data techniques allows to correct for first-order autocorrelation but not for
15
unobserved fixed effects we also run fixed effects, which still suffers from all above-
mentioned econometric problems.
Finally, our main regression, which corrects for all the estimation problems of the
panel data, except for the specification described above also includes the inverse mills
ratio from Heckman two step procedure, the lagged value of spillovers and investment in
new machinery and equipment. In addition, we apply a generalised least squared method
which corrects for a general form of both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.
6. Results
6.1. Sectoral Spillovers of Technology Transfer
In this section we present and discuss empirical estimates of spillovers of
technology transfer. We first focus on overall spillovers of technology transfer at the
sectoral level, then discuss how spillovers vary with firm size, trade orientation, on firm' s
ownership structure and, finally, how spillovers depend on proximity of domestic firms to
foreign firms.
Table 5 shows the results of estimating the basic specification, i.e. without
interaction terms, with OLS, FE and GLS estimation methods for three measures of
spillovers. Our main spillover variable is the share of foreign firms’ employment in total
industry’s employment. However, two other measures of spillovers, the share of foreign
firms in total industry’s sales and total industry’s equity are used as robustness check.
In the interpretation we focus on interpreting the estimates obtained with the GLS
method, which is the methodologically most rigorous procedure. Most of the coefficients
are significant at 1% and 10% significance level. The effect of technology transfer is
positive and significant when spillover is measured as share in employment and equity.
These spillover estimates suggest that an increase of FDI presence by 10 percentage
points would increase the output growth of domestic firms by 1.5% in if FDI presence
measured as share in employment, and by 0.4% if it is measured as share in equity. The
effects are larger but less significant when using the less accurate OLS and FE methods.
                                                                                                                                                
heteroskedasticity. The estimates from these methods are similar in sign and significance to those obtained
by fixed effects, therefore are not presented in the appendix.
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Hence, the size of spillover effects is positively related to foreign presence in
terms of equity and employment but not sales. Among the control variables, investment
in intangible assets is positive and significant at 1% significance level, although, quite
small in magnitude. That is, if the domestic firm increases its investment in intangible
assets (know-how, brand names, managerial skills or marketing and export networks) by
10% this will contribute to an increase of 0.05% of output growth. Increasing the
investment in new machinery and equipment by 10% will induce an output growth of
between 0.9% and 1.2%. If the local firm increases the number of skilled workers by
10%, its output would growth by 1.1% for all three measures of spillovers. With respect
to competition variables all coefficients but one are insignificant.
In table 6 we present GLS regression results including the interaction terms of the
spillover variable with investment in intangible assets, investment in new machinery and
equipment and labor quality, to account for the indirect effect of spillovers. Since the
interaction of labor quality with the spillover variable accounts for the movement of
skilled labor from and to domestic firms, and the Herfindahl indexes capture the effect of
competition, what remains to be captured from the spillover coefficient is the effects of
demonstration-imitation and vertical linkages.
The direct spillover effect is positive and significant at 1% significance level if
proxied by FDI-share in employment or sales. Thus base-case domestic firms with low
intangible assets, investments and human capital benefit from an increase in foreign share
in employment or sales.
In the same equations, investment in intangible assets is positive and significant at
1% significance level. Hence, firms increasing investment in intangibles by 10%
increases the output growth by 0.5% and 0.3% respectively. However, the interaction
with the spillover variable is negative and significant at 1% significance level. The
negative coefficient of this interaction term means that the larger the presence of foreign
firms in industry, the less investment by domestic firms will lead to output growth. A
possible explanation is that in industries with large foreign presence, the foreign firms
dominate the up-market segment (where intangible assets are crucial) and local firms find
it hard to penetrate this segment by upgrading their technology and brand names.
17
The coefficient of labor quality is positive and significant at 1% in all cases and
similar in magnitude, suggesting that a larger share of skilled workers increases domestic
firms output growth. The interaction of labor quality with the spillover variable is
negative and significant at 1% significant for both the spillover measured as share in
employment and sale. In other words, the larger the share of foreign firms in industry’s
employment or sale the lower is the share of skilled workers in domestic firms. We
interpret this negative coefficient of the interaction term as indication of a net-movement
of skilled labor from domestic towards foreign firms, possibly attracted by higher wages.
This argument is supported from our findings on the performance of foreign firms
relative to domestic firms, in table 4. The last column on real wages, as argued before
shows that foreign firms pay higher wages (efficiency wages) than domestic firms.
The effect of competition is captured by separate Herfindahl indices constructed
for foreign and domestic firms respectively. This coefficient is negative and significant at
5% or 10% significance level, suggesting that competition from foreign firms matters for
the productivity growth of domestic firms. Competition from foreign firms appears to
induce domestic firms to better use their resources in order to maintain their market
share, which in turn enhances their productivity. A reduction of industry concentration
(increase in competition) by 10% increases output growth by 3.4% to 3.9%.
The effects differ on some aspects if the spillover is proxied with foreign
investor’s share of equity in the industry. The direct effect is negative and significant at
5% significance level. This suggests that a large share of foreign firms in industries’
equity is not beneficial for base case local firms. However, they can increase their
benefits by investing in intangible assets or labor quality, both of which have positive and
significant coefficients, whereas investment in new machinery and equipment has a
significant but counter intuitive negative sign. The interaction of the spillover variable
with investment in new machinery and with labor quality is positive and significant.
Hence where foreign firms in the industry are equity-intensive, domestic firms would
benefit in higher output growth by investing in upgrading their physical and human
capital.
As an overall conclusion, we find that spillovers from technology transfer to
domestic firms are on average positive and substantive (Table 5). However, the actual
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benefits received by a local firm depend on both its own characteristics and the capital
and employment intensity of the foreign investors (Table 6). The direct effect on base-
case local firms is positive when spillovers are measured as foreign firms’ share in
employment or sale, but negative when measured as foreign firms’ share in equity.
Intangible assets such as know-how or brand names, investment in new
machinery, and skilled workers increase the output growth of domestic firms. However,
if foreign firms dominate the industry, domestic firms experience a smaller effect of these
investments on output. Moreover, competition from foreign firms positively affects the
output growth.
Substantial negative spillovers may arise with the loss of skilled workers to
foreign firms. This is detrimental for the output growth of domestic firms. Nevertheless,
for firms with high labor quality its impact on output growth depends on the type of
foreign investor they face.
6.2. Firm Size and Trade Orientation.
The pooling of all firms in our sample to estimate the spillover coefficient may
hide important variations in spillover effects for different groups of firms. We thus
differentiate the analysis by firm size and trade orientation. Large firms arguably have
more resources to invest in new technology and hence are able to absorb the advanced
technology of foreign firms or to attract qualified labor force and therefore cope better
with increased competition introduced by foreign firms. On the other hand, export
oriented domestic firms produce for foreign markets, and thus may have interfaces of
their own to learn about advanced technology and management practices. In order to
account for both factors we divide the sample into large and small firms12 as well as into
firms that export and firms that produce only for domestic market and run our baseline
specification for both sub-samples.
Table 7 shows the regression results for the sub-samples of large and small
domestic firms. We find that large domestic firms do not benefit from a direct spillover
via demonstration or linkage effects. (K: A large firm with base case characteristics does
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not exist!). The spillovers they may receive depend on their own investment in intangible
assets, in new machinery and equipment and in skilled workers. Hence, it appears that
large firms are to a high degree masters of their own destiny. In contrast, small firms
receive large positive direct spillovers attributable to demonstration-imitation and vertical
linkage effects. Yet, they are not able to increase benefits of spillovers by own investment
in intangible assets and new machinery and equipment. Moreover, they experience a loss
of skilled labor. Hence, small firms may grow with direct relations with foreign firms, but
the size of this spillover does not increase with own capability development.
Table 8 presents the results from firm trade orientation. For exporting firm, the
direct effect is negative and not significant, and apart from the labor quality variable, the
interaction effects are small and insignificant.  This result supports the argument that for
exporting firms what matters more is knowledgeable of buyers overseas, rather than
foreign presence in the domestic markets. In remarkable contrast, non-exporting firms
experience positive significant direct spillovers. They can significantly increase the
extend of spillovers with their own investment in new machinery and equipment, as the
interaction effect is positive and significant at 1% significance level. Another interesting
result is that while competition from domestic firms is beneficial for domestic firms,
competition from foreign firms is harmful, however not as much as to push domestic
firms up their average cost curve resulting in negative spillovers as in Aitken and
Harrison (1999).
6.3. Spillovers related to domestic firm ownership structure.
As an extension to the literature referred in this paper, in this section we would
like to investigate spillovers related to ownership structure. As suggested in the literature
FDI may foster economic growth by increasing competition in the host country, forcing
thus domestic firms to restructure in order to be efficient. Restructuring has been very
important in transition economies. The outcome of privatization process in Estonia, as
well as in other transition economies, has resulted in full or partial transfer of ownership
rights of firms to different groups such as managers, employees, domestic institutions,
                                                                                                                                                
12
 Small firms are those with at least 100 employees, while large firms those with more than 100
employees. With this division our sample of 1478 domestic firms has 947 small firms and 531 big firms,
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domestic individuals not employed by the firm and/or foreign firms or individuals. This
has given rise to a wide variety of ownership structures that for the purpose of this study
are classified within three main domestic firm ownership groups: insider dominated,
domestic outsider dominated and state dominated. The question asked is whether firms
belonging to one of the last three groups are more likely to benefit from spillovers than
those belonging to the other two groups? As usually insider owned firms are small, labor-
intensive and face limited access to capital, therefore we expect them to be less able to
absorb technology and cope with competition than domestic outsider and state owned
firms.
Table 9 shows the results of the impact of domestic firm ownership structure on
its output growth. The first column of this table presents results without dummy for
ownership control, which we also discussed in table 6. After controlling for domestic
firm ownership structure we see that the significance, sign and magnitude of variables
generally remains the same. In contrast, the coefficients of foreign and domestic
competition are larger in magnitude. Furthermore, both ownership dummies are positive
and significant, however, the coefficient of the dummy for outsider owned firms is
slightly larger in absolute value than that of the state owned firms’ dummy. That is, if
both ownership shares increase by 10 percent, outsider owned firms experience an output
growth of 0.1% larger than state owned firms. This finding is consistent with Jones and
Mygind (1999) who find private owned firms to perform better than state owned firms.
Nevertheless, insider owned firms perform worse than both state and outsider owned
firms. This is not surprising given that, as suggested from the theory, workers interests
are in conflict with managers who look upon the long-term interests of their enterprise.
They will hamper restructuring by resisting lay-offs and investing little in capital
equipment as stressed for example by Frydman et al (1993).
The above specifications, however, assume that different ownership structures
affect only the regression’s intercept but not the slopes, i.e., all coefficients other than the
intercept are the same across firms with different ownership structures. Nevertheless, this
may not be the case, therefore, we proceed in our analysis by dividing the sample of
domestic firms into state, outsider and insider owned and run regressions for all these
                                                                                                                                                
whereas the mean number of employee is 139 employees.
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sub-samples. Table 10 provides the results of these regressions. We see that although
state owned firms have large positive and significant spillovers from demonstration-
imitation and vertical linkages they do not have the ability to benefit from spillover
effects through their own investment in intangible assets (know-how, brand name,
managerial experience, etc), and in new machinery and equipment. Furthermore, they
experience a loss of skilled workers to foreign firms. This suggests that for these firms
what matters most is the direct contacts with foreign firms, rather then their own
capability development. Competition, however, has a positive effect on their performance
inducing them to use inputs more efficiently in keeping their market share. On the other
hand, outsider owned firms, as expected, do benefit from spillovers from demonstration-
imitation and vertical linkages, but not as much as state owned firms, because, as
indicated by the coefficients of interaction terms, they rely on their internal abilities to
catch up with their foreign counterparts.
Insider owned firms experience negative spillovers from technology transfer. This
suggests that they are neither able to benefit from direct contacts with foreign firms nor
capable to absorb advanced technologies of foreign firms. Yet, these firms can hold on to
their skilled labor, probably due to the fact that employees in these firms are also
shareholders of the company. Finally, they also face a detrimental competition from both
foreign competition and the other domestic firms. That is, foreign and other domestic
firms produce at a much lower cost and hence take market shares away from these firms
pushing them up their average cost curve, thus, forcing them to cut on production.
As a conclusion, ownership structure matters for the ability of the domestic firms
to benefit from spillovers of technology transfer. We find that state owned and outsider
owned firms benefit from spillovers of technology transfer, whereas insider owned firms
experience strong negative spillovers. However, only outsider owned firms have the
capability development to catch up with foreign competitors. Positive spillovers of both
state and outsider owned firms are also supported by competition.
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7. Conclusions
In this paper we investigate spillovers from technology transfer to domestic firms
in a transition economy. The research questions we raise are the following: a) Are there
spillovers of technology transfer to domestic firms? b) Do these spillovers depend on
domestic firms’ absorptive capacity? c) Do spillovers depend on firm size and domestic
firm trade orientation?, and d) on the ownership structure of domestic firms?
In answering these questions we have disentangled the effect of technology
transfer from that of competition employing technology and competition control
variables. We employ a panel data on Estonian firms for the period 1995-1999, and use a
production function framework to estimate the impact of technology transfer from FDI on
the productivity of domestic firms. We find that spillovers from technology transfer
depend on the measure of spillovers used. Furthermore, they depend on firm size, its
ownership structure, domestic firm trade orientation and their proximity to foreign firms.
In addition, spillovers of technology transfer benefit from competition of foreign firms as
it makes domestic firms use more efficiently their existing technologies, or search for
new ones to maintain their market shares. Moreover, although possessing skilled labor
increases output growth, its movement toward foreign firms significantly harms the
indigenous firm output growth. Furthermore, by investing in intangible assets and in new
machinery and equipment benefits domestic firms in higher output growth. However, this
is not sufficient for domestic firms to benefit from the advanced technology of foreign
firms especially when the industry is characterized by large shares of foreign firms in
employment, sales or equity. In addition, we find that state owned and outsider owned
firms benefit from spillovers of technology transfer whereas, insider owned firms
experience strong negative spillovers. However, only outsider owned firms have the
resources and capabilities, such as better managerial experience, better access to finance
or deeper restructuring, to catch up with foreign competitors. Positive spillovers of both
state and outsider owned firms are also supported by competition. In conclusion, the
policy implications for the host country governments would be to foster competition as it
induces domestic firms be more efficient in using the existing technology or search for
new technology so that they keep their existing market share. As domestic firms benefit
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more from an increase in foreign share in employment or sale, rather than an increase in
foreign share in equity, the host country government should create incentives for foreign
firms to employ mainly local workers and invest in their training. This would reduce the
movement of skilled workers from domestic to foreign firms. Moreover, for the country
itself is important to possess educated people as this is necessary for the domestic firm
output growth and for benefiting from the advanced technology of foreign firms.
Although the conclusions of this paper point towards significant effect of foreign
presence on domestic firms' output growth future research ought to verify the robustness
of our results. More specifically alternative definitions of competition such as industry
concentration ratio, import penetration, market share and rents could be employed.
Furthermore, if data becomes available one potential extension would be to distinguish in
between intra and inter industry spillovers.
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Appendix
Table 1: Variable definition
Variables Definitions
Output Net sales are used as proxy. Expressed in thousands of kroons.
Employment Firm' s number of employees per year.
Materials Materials are calculated as the sum of raw materials, fuel and
electricity. Expressed in thousands of kroons.
Capital Capital is calculated as the average of fixed assets at the beginning
and end of year. Expressed in thousands of kroons.
IAsset Intangible assets. Expressed in Thousands of kroons
Spillover (Employment) Spillover in industry is the share of foreign firms’ employment in
total employment of the industry.
Spillover (Sale) The share of foreign firms’ sales in total industry sales.
Spillover (Equity) The share of foreign firms’ equity participation in total industry
equity.
Location Spillover The share of foreign firms’ employment in total employment in
industry j in region i.
Real Wage Real wage per worker is the ratio of total expenditure on wages and
salaries per year to number of employees. Expressed in thousands
of kroons.
Investment The expenditure on new machinery and equipment per year. Used
to account for investment in new technology. Expressed in
thousands of kroons.
Labor Quality The share of skilled workers in total workforce
Export Total revenue from export. Expressed in thousands of kroons
Ownership Share The share in firm' s equity of a particular group.
Herfindahl Index
Used to capture monopoly power = ∑ 



j
j
i
Sale
Sale
2
j-industry, i-firm
Industry Groups Constructed on a two-digit industry classification.
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Table 2: Mean and Standard Deviation for the whole sample
Variables Observations Mean Standard Deviation
Output 1836 40734 95877
Labor 1836 132 232
Capital 1836 12768 35846
Materials 1836 15562 45414
IAsset 1836 888 4583
Investment 1836 1319 5873
Export 1836 13099 40552
Real wage 1836 34.3 34.64
Share of Skilled workers 1278 0.79 0.17
For. Herfindahl 1836 0.048 0.111
Dom. Herfindahl 1836 0.09 0.08
All variables are deflated at the 1995 prices.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
       Number of Firms              Foreign Presence in %Industries
Domestic
(1)
Foreign
(2)
Total
(3)
IAsset/Y
in %
(4)
Spill.Emp
(5)
Spill.Sale
(6)
Spill.Equity
(7)
Food Products 227 21  248 49.9 8.37 17.8 25
Textile Products 97 30 127 2.3 13.2 11.3 5.4
Leather Products 19 14 33 2.17 50.2 73 84.18
Wood, Paper and Pulp Products 158 36 194 8.69 17.8 24.2 57.4
Coke, Petroleum and Chemical
Products
37 21 58 3.20 13.3 20.3 19.7
Rubber, Plastic & Non-Metallic
 Products
85 42 127 8.56 45.5 68.5 56.9
Metallic Products 75 17 92 0.84 8.7 15.1 21.16
Manufact. of Machinery & Equipment79 18 97 1.4 10.9 17.8 4.5
Manufac. of Electrical and Transport
Equipment.
107 30 137 4.03 13.2 22.2 14.86
Furniture & Other Manufacture 72 22 94 5.91 16.6 25.3 12.78
Electricity, Gas & Water Supply 56 5 61 0.36 34.7 72.7 25.8
Construction 199 11 210 1.67 6.9 8 1.5
Wholesale & Retail Trade 267 91 358 1.43 12.6 23.3 31.9
Total 1478 358 1836 9.76 15.6 25 26.2
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Table 4: The performance of foreign firms relative to domestic firms
Industry K/L
(1)
Y/L
(2)
IAsset/Y
(3)
Fsize
(4)
Invest/Y
(5)
Export/Y
(6)
RW/L
(7)
Food Products 2.76 2.36 0.02 1.04 0.67 1.76 1.53
Textile Products 0.64 0.93 1.41 0.46 0.4 1.09 1.18
Leather Products 2.71 2.67 0 .5 1.27 0.91 1.67 2.03
Wood, Pulp and Paper
Products
2.67 2.61 0.07 0.86 1.5 1.72 1.58
Coke, Petroleum
& Chemical Products
5.24 2 0.92 0.13 0.31 1.04 1.46
Rubber, Plastic & Non-
Metallic Products
5.54 2.69 1.97 1.67 0.56 2.05 1.79
Metallic Products 1.69 3.23 0.65 0.44 0.31 0.99 1.38
Manuf. of Machinery and
Equipment
0.49 2.40 0.19 0.41 1.06 2.33 1.78
Manuf. of Transport and
Electrical Equip.
0.69 2.68 0.13 0.44 1.15 1.52 1.56
Manuf. of Furniture and
Other Manufacturing
1.36 2.52 0.48 0.53 1.72 1.34 1.63
Electricity, Gas and Water
Supply
3.00 6.59 11.5 7.1 0.46 . 2.27
Construction 0.96 1.32 0.18 1.48 0.53 1.49 1.33
Wholesale and Retail
Trade
2.17 2.96 1.43 0.35 1.66 1.5 1.77
All Industries 2.27 2.49 0.25 0.69 0.95 1.75 1.55
Note: Each number is obtained as: Mean(Variable)Foreign Firm/Mean(variable) Domestic Firm.
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Table 5: The net impact of spillovers to the output growth of domestic firms using
different estimation methods.
Dependant Variable: Growth of output of domestic firms.
Spillover Employment Spillover Sale Spillover EquityVariables
OLS
(1)
FE
(2)
GLS
(3)
OLS
(4)
FE
(5)
GLS
(6)
OLS
(7)
FE
(8)
GLS
(9)
Spillover t-1 0.19
(0.84)
0.34
(1.43)
0.15*
(3.30)
0.08
(0.43)
0.29
(1.52)
0.03
(1.21)
0.05
(0.59)
0.12
(1.26)
0.04***
(1.78)
IAsset/Y 0.005***
(1.78)
0.004
(0.24)
0.005*
(3.05)
0.005***
(1.81)
0.004
(0.28)
0.005*
(2.91)
0.005***
(1.79)
0.004
(0.26)
0.005*
(4.62)
(Investment/Y) t-1 0.14
(0.49)
-0.08
(-0.39)
0.09*
(2.85)
0.15
(0.51)
-0.09
(-0.44)
0.11*
(3.01)
0.15
(0.51)
-0.08
(-0.41)
0.12*
(3.64)
Labor Quality 0.11
(1.40)
-0.08
(-0.72)
0.11*
(18.33)
0.11
(1.40)
-0.10
(-0.90)
0.11*
(19.9)
0.11
(1.37)
-0.09
(-0.86)
0.11*
(17.9)
For. Herfindahl -0.41
(-0.82)
-0.37
(-0.50)
-0.15
(-1.18)
-0.37
(-0.77)
-0.42
(-0.56)
-0.09
(-0.68)
-0.39
(-0.87)
-0.38
(-0.51)
-0.20
(-1.34)
Dom. Herfindahl -0.21
(-0.49)
-0.11
(0.22)
-0.16***
(-1.71)
-0.18
(-0.42)
-0.11
(-0.22)
-0.08
(-0.83)
-0.24
(-0.57)
-0.21
(-0.42)
-0.15
(-1.30)
Export/Y 0.003
(-0.06)
0.05
(0.35)
0.01
(0.19)
-0.002
(-0.07)
0.04
(0.32)
0.003
(0.56)
-0.003
(-0.07)
0.04
(1.30)
0.005
(0.65)
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nr. Observations 791 791 725 791 791 725 791 791 725
R-Sq 0.47 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.47 0.49
F-test13 14.59
(0.000)
23.56
(0.000)
9.8e+08
(0.000)
14.41
(0.000)
23.59
(0.000)
9.6e+07
(0.000)
14.16
(0.000)
23.52
(0.000)
1.14e+07
(0.000)
Hausman-Test 66.34
(0.000)
68.5
(0.000)
66.78
(0.000)
LM test of AR(1)
For unbalanced
panels.
105
P(chi2)=
0.0000
105
P(chi2)=
0.000
103
P(chi2)=
0.0000
Wald-test for
groupwise
heteroscedasticity
278.00
P(chi2)=
0.0000
122
P(chi2)=
0.0000
147
P(chi2)=
0.0000
Note:  Inputs (capital, labor and materials), a constant and Mills ratio (obtained from
Heckman two-step procedure) are also included in regression as right hand side
variable.
*, ** and *** indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively.
z-statistic in parentheses.
                                                
13
 The equivalent of F-test in GLS regressions is Wald-statistic that has a chi-squared distribution.
28
Table 6: The net impact of spillover with interaction terms, accounting for indirect effect
of spillovers.
Dependant Variable: Growth of output of domestic firms.
Variables GLS
(Empl)
(1)
GLS
(Sale)
(2)
GLS
(Equity)
(3)
Spillovert-1 0.36*
(4.80)
0.35*
(6.40)
-0.12**
(-2.41)
IAsset/Y 0.05*
(9.36)
0.03*
(10.89)
0.07*
(6.88)
 (Investment/Y)t-1 0.03
(0.35)
0.08
(1.06)
-0.32*
(-3.53)
Labor Quality 0.15*
(17.52)
0.19*
(17.09)
0.08*
(5.71)
IAsset/Y *Spillovert-1 -0.41*
(-8.33)
-0.13*
(-13.18)
-0.21*
(-6.21)
(Investment/Y)t-1*Spillovert-1 0.025
(0.05)
0.11
(0.29)
0.93*
(4.62)
Labor Quality*Spillovert-1 -0.26*
(-3.93)
-0.33*
(-5.67)
0.19*
(3.67)
For. Herfindahl -0.34***
(-1.84)
-0.39**
(-2.24)
-0.36**
(-2.30)
Dom. Herfindahl -0.19
(-1.34)
-0.23***
(-1.88)
-0.20
(-1.30)
Export/Y 0.01
(-1.46)
-0.01
(-1.59)
-0.006
(-0.61)
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummy Yes Yes Yes
Nr. Observations 725 725 725
Wald-test for joint significance
of coefficients
1.87e+07
(0.000)
8.2e+04
(0.000)
1.7e+04
(0.000)
Note: Inputs (capital, labor and materials), a constant and Mills ratio (obtained from
Heckman two-step procedure) are also included in regression as right hand side
variable.
*, ** and *** indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively.
z-statistic in parentheses.
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Table 7: The impact of firm size on spillovers to domestic firms.
Dependant Variable: Growth of output of domestic firms. GLS results.
Variables Large Firms
(1)
Small Firms
(2)
Spillovert-1 0.09
(0.37)
1.68*
(8.32)
IAsset/Y -0.44
(-1.48)
0.043*
(10.89)
 (Investment/Y)t-1 -0.84*
(-4.02)
1.01*
(11.21)
Labor Quality -0.15**
(-2.79)
0.38*
(14.79)
IAsset/Y *Spillovert-1 2.53***
(1.92)
-0.32*
(9.17)
(Investment/Y)t-1*Spillovert-1 2.24**
(2.03)
-1.20
(-1.51)
Labor Quality*Spillovert-1 0.44***
(1.64)
-1.86*
(-7.93)
For. Herfindahl -0.64***
(-1.85)
-0.91
(-0.29)
Dom. Herfindahl -0.37
(-1.17)
-0.22
(-1.09)
Export/Y -0.016
(-0.96)
0.11*
(8.98)
Industry Dummy Yes Yes
Time Dummy Yes Yes
Nr. Observations 297 396
Wald-test for joint significance of
coefficients
6.3e+03
(0.000)
5.6e+05
(0.000)
Note:  Inputs (capital, labor and materials), a constant and Mills ratio (obtained from
Heckman two-step procedure) are also included in regression as right hand side
variable.
*, ** and *** indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively
z-statistic in parentheses.
30
Table 8: The impact of trade on spillovers to domestic firms.
Dependant Variable: Growth of output of domestic firms. GLS results.
Variables Exporting Firms
(1)
Non-Exporting Firms
(2)
Spillovert-1 -0.27
(-1.26)
3.21*
(9.50)
IAsset/Y 0.16*
(2.87)
0.11*
(5.79)
 (Investment/Y)t-1 -0.30**
(-1.51)
-0.34
(-1.24)
Labor Quality -0.05**
(-2.25)
0.36*
(13.15)
IAsset/Y *Spillovert-1 -0.54
(-1.16)
-0.99*
(-5.28)
(Investment/Y)t-1*Spillovert-1 0.37
(0.48)
9.86*
(4.41)
Labor Quality*Spillovert-1 0.79*
(3.74)
-3.97*
(-10.36)
For. Herfindahl -0.21
(-0.70)
2.39*
(3.43)
Dom. Herfindahl 0.05
(0.20)
-2.54*
(-6.81)
Industry Dummy Yes Yes
Time Dummy Yes Yes
Nr. Observations 457 211
Wald-test for joint significance of
coefficients
3.8e+05
(0.000)
1.61e+09
(0.000)
Note:  Inputs (capital, labor and materials), a constant and Mills ratio (obtained from
Heckman two-step procedure) are also included in regression as right hand side
variable.
*, ** and *** indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively.
z-statistic in parentheses.
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Table 9: The impact of firm ownership on output growth.
Dependant Variable: Growth of output of domestic firms.
Variables GLS
W/o Ownership
control.
(1)
GLS
W. Ownership
control.
(2)
Spillovert-1 0.36*
(4.70)
0.39*
(3.02)
IAsset/Y 0.05*
(9.36)
0.05*
(14.94)
 (Investment/Y)t-1 0.03
(0.35)
0.02
(0.25)
Labor Quality 0.16*
(17.52)
0.17*
(16.04)
IAsset/Y *Spillovert-1 -0.41*
(-8.33)
-0.44*
(-14.13)
(Investment/Y)t-1*Spillovert-1 0.026
(0.05)
0.12
(0.21)
Labor Quality*Spillovert-1 -0.26*
(-3.93)
-0.33*
(-3.72)
For. Herfindahl -0.34***
(-1.84)
-0.45**
(-2.14)
Dom. Herfindahl -0.19
(-1.34)
-0.33***
(-1.86)
Export/Y -0.01
(-1.46)
-0.004
(-0.66)
State Dummy 0.039*
(6.74)
Outsider Dummy 0.044*
(7.71)
Industry Dummy Yes Yes
Time Dummy Yes Yes
Nr. Observations 725 725
Wald-test for joint significance of
coefficients
1.87e+07
(0.000)
2.8e+06
(0.000)
Note:  Inputs (capital, labor and materials), a constant and Mills ratio (obtained from
Heckman two-step procedure) are also included in regression as right hand side
variable.
* and **  indicate 1% and 5% significance level, respectively.
z-statistic in parentheses.
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Table 10: Spillovers to State and Private Owned Firms.
Dependant Variable: Growth of output of domestic firms.  GLS results.
Variables State Firms
(1)
Outsider-Owned
Firms
(2)
Insider-Owned
Firms
(3)
Spillovert-1 2.49*
(7.92)
0.61**
(2.03)
-4.93*
(-6.93)
IAsset/Y 0.43*
(5.64)
-1.62*
(-7.46)
0.59
(1.34)
 (Investment/Y)t-1 1.48*
(9.43)
-0.11
(-0.71)
0.12
(0.14)
Labor Quality 0.53*
(12.38)
-0.008
(-0.18)
-0.40*
(-5.01)
IAsset/Y *Spillovert-1 -3.90*
(-5.53)
4.69*
(4.81)
-2.67**
(-2.26)
(Investment/Y)t-1*Spillovert-1 -3.92*
(-4.26)
0.31
(0.54)
-15.44**
(-2.32)
Labor Quality*Spillovert-1 -2.45*
(-7.38)
-0.36
(-1.13)
5.51*
(6.92)
For. Herfindahl -3.13*
(-7.33)
-0.79*
(-3.97)
4.43*
(3.31)
Dom. Herfindahl -2.25*
(-6.09)
0.12
(0.59)
1.69*
(2.94)
Export/Y -0.003
(-0.10)
0.08*
(4.22)
-0.026
(-0.86)
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummy Yes Yes Yes
Nr. Observations 320 203 164
Wald-test for joint significance of
coefficients
3.1e+06
(0.000)
6.98e+07
(0.000)
1.46e+07
(0.000)
Note:  Inputs (capital, labor and materials), a constant and Mills ratio (obtained from
Heckman two-step procedure) are also included in regression as right hand side
variable.
*, ** and *** indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively.
  z-statistic in parentheses.
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